Determining which moral principles should guide political action is a vexing question in political theory. This is especially true when faced with the "toleration paradox": believing that something is morally wrong but also believing that it is wrong to suppress it. In this book, Alex Tuckness argues that John Locke's potential contribution to this debate--what Tuckness terms the "legislative point of view"--has long been obscured by overemphasis on his doctrine of consent. Building on a line of reasoning Locke made explicit (...) in his later writings on religious toleration, Tuckness explores the idea that we should act politically only on those moral principles that a reasonable legislator would endorse; someone, that is, who would avoid enacting measures that could be self-defeating when applied by fallible human beings.Tuckness argues that the legislative point of view has implications that go far beyond the question of religious toleration. Locke suggests an approach to political justification that is a provocative alternative to the utilitarian, contractualist, and perfectionist approaches dominating contemporary liberalism. The legislative point of view is relevant to our thinking about many types of disputed principles, Tuckness writes. He examines claims of moral wrong, invocations of the public good, and contested political roles with emphasis on the roles of legislators and judges. This book is must reading not only for students and scholars of Locke but all those interested in liberalism, toleration, and constitutional theory. (shrink)

The virtue of mercy is widely admired, but is now marginalized in contemporary public life. Yet for centuries it held a secure place in western public discourse without implying a necessary contradiction with justice. Alex Tuckness and John M. Parrish ask how and why this changed. Examining Christian and non-Christian ancient traditions, along with Kantian and utilitarian strains of thought, they offer a persuasive account of how our perception of mercy has been transformed by Enlightenment conceptions of impartiality and equality (...) that place justice and mercy in tension. Understanding the logic of this decline, they argue, will make it possible to promote and defend a more robust role for mercy in public life. Their study ranges from Homer to the late Enlightenment and from ancient tragedies to medieval theologies to contemporary philosophical texts, and will be valuable to readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

When citizens and legislators attempt to justify coercive acts, such as fines or imprisonment, they often do so on the basis of controversial justificatory principles. There are at least two ways a principle can be controversial: one may claim that the principle in question is false; or one may claim that the principle, correctly applied, does not actually justify the specific act in question. Thus, suppose the state invokes the principle ‘false beliefs should be censored’ to justify silencing a dissident. (...) The dissident might disagree because she thinks the state should not be in the business of censoring false beliefs, or she might agree with the principle but object to the action because she is quite convinced that her beliefs are not false. (shrink)

John Locke figures prominently in accounts of the development of the principle of religious toleration in liberal societies. Locke's first published essays were on the subject of toleration, specifically on the question of whether the magistrate had the right to regulate the behavior of citizens in ecclesiastical matters about which the Bible does not directly speak, such as whether to use the book of common prayer, the proper physical position for taking communion, the wearing of surplices, and so on. In (...) the Two Tracts, Locke rejected the principal religious reason for religious persecution, that it might help lead people to the true religion. Locke shows a deep concern with the fallibility and partiality of human judgment and sees the magistrate's ability to settle inevitable controversies as crucial to maintaining order and peace. Locke's An Essay Concerning Toleration (ECT) represented the critical change in his practical attitudes toward toleration. (shrink)

The virtue of mercy is widely admired, but is now marginalized in contemporary public life. Yet for centuries it held a secure place in western public discourse without implying a necessary contradiction with justice. Alex Tuckness and John M. Parrish ask how and why this changed. Examining Christian and non-Christian ancient traditions, along with Kantian and utilitarian strains of thought, they offer a persuasive account of how our perception of mercy has been transformed by Enlightenment conceptions of impartiality and equality (...) that place justice and mercy in tension. Understanding the logic of this decline, they argue, will make it possible to promote and defend a more robust role for mercy in public life. Their study ranges from Homer to the late Enlightenment and from ancient tragedies to medieval theologies to contemporary philosophical texts, and will be valuable to readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the philosophy of law. (shrink)